Latin America and Antarctica
Summary and Keywords
Since the early 19th century, a number of Latin American countries have had active interests in the Antarctic continent. These interests began to accelerate in the early 20th century, and during the 1930s and 1940s, Argentina and Chile formalized sovereignty claims to the Antarctic Peninsula region. These claims overlapped not only with each other, but also with Great Britain’s claim to the “Falkland Islands Dependencies.” The two Latin American claims tended to be framed in the language of anti-imperialism, and for a while at least the idea of a “South American Antarctica” emerged to suggest a common front against the British Empire. Rivalry between Argentina and Chile, however, remained strong, and the alliance against imperialism never developed into a lasting agreement. In 1959, Argentina and Chile joined with ten other nations—including Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—in signing the Antarctic Treaty. This Treaty suspended sovereignty claims and created a “continent dedicated to peace and science.” Following the ratification of the Treaty in 1961, Argentina and Chile lessened their hostility to the imperial strategy of using scientific research as a justification for political claims, and came to be enthusiastic members of what some outsiders labeled an “exclusive club.” During the 1980s and early 1990s, four other Latin American nations—Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador—became full members of the Antarctic Treaty, attracted, in part, by the prospect of sharing in a potential minerals bonanza in the southern continent. This expected economic boom never came, however, and instead the Antarctic continent became one of the most protected environments anywhere on the planet by the terms of the 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol.
Keywords: Antarctica, Antarctic Treaty, International Geophysical Year, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, imperialism, nationalism, history of science, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol
The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas famously divided the world between Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence. Most references to this treaty focus on its longitude, 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, and the “geographical accident” that helped to make Brazil Portuguese speaking. But also of interest to the history of Latin America is the reference to latitude contained within this important legal document. The Treaty of Tordesillas divided the Atlantic World not only between Spain and Portugal, but also “from pole to pole,” making explicit reference to high northern and southern latitudes. The Arctic is a long way from Latin America, but Antarctica is much closer to parts of the region. Even though the first recorded sightings of the Antarctic continent would not take place until 1820—at a time when the Spanish and Portuguese American Empires were rapidly crumbling—the Treaty of Tordesillas nevertheless functions as the foundational document for Latin American interest in the Antarctic continent.1
While the Treaty of Tordesillas helps to give the countries of Latin America a long history of connection to the southern continent, active interest in Antarctica really began in the early 20th century.2 Unsurprisingly, the two countries at the center of Latin American interest in Antarctica are Argentina and Chile, the two closest countries anywhere in the world to the Antarctic continent. A number of other more tropical Latin American countries also have active interests in Antarctica, and in addition to Argentina and Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador are all today full members of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the international system that continues to govern the southern continent up to the present. Four other Latin American nations are currently non-consultative members of the Antarctic Treaty, meaning that around one fifth of all its members are from Latin America.
Within the diversity of the Latin American “Antarctic experience,” an important unifying theme is the internal tension between imperialism and anti-imperialism. Antarctica has offered the countries of Latin America an important sphere where geopolitical ambitions have clashed with anti-imperial idealism, and where Latin American countries have wrestled with their identity on an international stage.3 The balance has changed over time, and has varied from country to country. A general trend, however, has been an increasing willingness to abandon at least some of the early anti-imperial idealism and engage more fully with established global powers. Connected to these tensions are the racial ideas associated with climate and climatic determinism: like many other countries, Latin American nations have often viewed Antarctica’s extreme climate as offering an ideal testing ground to prove ideas of racial fitness and national strength.
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 can be seen as something of a watershed in the history of Latin American engagement with Antarctica.4 Before the signing of the Treaty, in December 1959, Argentine and Chilean Antarctic policies were characterized by passionate anti-imperial sentiments that often—although certainly not always—rejected the use of universalizing science to make claims. By signing the Treaty, the governments of Buenos Aires and Santiago joined with Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and seven other countries in declaring Antarctica to be a “continent dedicated to peace and science.” Signing the Treaty did not mean that Argentina and Chile renounced their sovereignty claims to Antarctica—in fact these claims are in some ways protected by Article IV (Figure 1). But by joining the Antarctic Treaty, these two Latin American nations implicitly accepted the political utility of science, and gave their support to what some other post-colonial countries have referred to as an “imperial club.”5
Despite its exclusivity, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty paved the way for other Latin American countries to play a more active role in Antarctic affairs. Article IX of the Treaty requires a country to be conducting “substantial scientific research” in Antarctica before it can become a full member of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). During the 1980s and early 1990s, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador all became full members of the ATS by establishing research stations within the Antarctic Peninsula region. A large part of the motivation at this time was the prospect of participating in the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources, which was being negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty members. In the event, the 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol marked a dramatic shift towards conservation, and ended any immediate prospect for economic reward associated with membership of the ATS.6 All six Latin American consultative members have nevertheless continued to pursue scientific research in Antarctica and retain an interest in the politics of the southern continent. The decision, in 2003, to locate the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty in Buenos Aires ensures that Antarctic science and politics continues to have a distinctively Latin American component up to the present.
Argentina and Antarctica
Around the time of its independence from Spain, in the early 19th century, a handful of sailors from the country that was to become Argentina were beginning to explore the Antarctic Peninsula region, driven by the resource frontier of Antarctic sealing.7 Rather than the boom-bust economics of sealing, however, the central narrative of Argentina’s early engagement with the Antarctic continent was the idea of territorial loss. In 1833, the British Navy decided that it wanted a supply station close to the strategically important sea route around the southern tip of South America, and it made a territorial claim to the territory known to the British as the Falkland Islands.8 At the time of the British seizure of the Islas Malvinas, Argentine reactions were relatively muted and almost entirely ineffective, owing to the precarious political position of the fledgling state of Buenos Aires.9 Sovereignty over the South Atlantic archipelago was a low priority in contrast to the basic exigencies of state formation and survival. On top of this, Buenos Aires merchants were becoming increasing reliant on Great Britain for trade and investment, creating a reluctance to be over-critical.10
Scholars such as the Argentine political scientist Carlos Edcudé have noted a tendency to see the de facto territorial expansion of post-independence Argentina as being portrayed as territorial loss as the former viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata broke apart.11 By the early 20th century, the narratives of territorial loss were starting to be appropriated by popular nationalists, who were increasingly unhappy with the direction their country was taking. As immigrants from southern Europe continued to arrive in ever-larger numbers, Argentina was developing a two-tiered system where wealth was concentrated within a wealthy class of landowners. Domestic discontent was increasingly linked to what many nationalists saw as their country’s neo-colonial dependence on foreign powers, especially Great Britain. Within this context, the British “theft” of the Islas Malvinas served as a tangible demonstration of imperial intentions.12
With the Islas Malvinas becoming a classic territorial irredenta, the sovereignty of the archipelago was increasingly linked to the question of who owned Antarctica. From the late 1890s, global attention was drawn to the southern continent as explorers from various countries participated in a period of exploration that came to be known as the “heroic era,” centered upon the race to be the first nation to reach the South Pole.13 With a number of expeditions calling at Buenos Aires and Ushuaia on their way to the Antarctic Peninsula region, the Argentine population found itself drawn into the excitement of this frenetic period. Most dramatically, Argentina launched a successful voyage in October 1903 to rescue the Swedish Nordenskjold expedition, which had become stranded and separated around the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula.14 A couple of years after the rescue, the Argentine government took over the running of a meteorological station in the South Orkney Islands, which had been established by the Scottish explorer William Speirs Bruce.15
Running parallel to the growing excitement of the heroic era, the first decade of the 20th century also witnessed the development of a lucrative whaling industry in the Antarctic Peninsula region, directly to the south of South America.16 While most of the whalers and whaling companies came from Norway, the first commercial whaling company in Antarctica was financed by Argentine capital, following an investment appeal by the Norwegian whaling captain C. A. Larsen, in the aftermath of the Nordenskjold rescue.17 Located on the Island of South Georgia, which was loosely claimed by Great Britain, the establishment of the Compañía Argentina de Pesca raised the question of sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula region. In 1906, Argentine and Chilean diplomats began discussions about the question of who owned what in the Antarctic Peninsula region.18 In 1908, however, Great Britain used its occupation of the Falkland Islands to formalize a claim to an extensive sector of Antarctica known as the Falkland Islands Dependencies.19 Although neither South American country recognized the British claim, this move brought an end to the preliminary discussions between Argentina and Chile about the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula region. In both countries—but especially in Argentina—British economic influence remained strong, and there was a reluctance among the landowning elite to jeopardize what for them was a very profitable relationship.
The outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, in 1939, gave the Argentine government an opportunity to appease its nationalist critics.20 With Britain distracted by the conflict with Nazi Germany, there was little that could be done to defend the claims that had been made to the South Atlantic. Unlike the Islas Malvinas, which had been settled by British farmers and fishermen, Argentina could actively pursue its sovereignty claims in the unpopulated Antarctic Peninsula region without the risk of a direct confrontation. In the southern summers of 1940–1941 and 1941–1942, two Argentine naval expeditions sailed to Antarctica.21 The Argentine sailors planted Argentine flags, conducted ceremonies of possession, and destroyed signs of British sovereignty. Upon the return of the second Argentine expedition, a formal claim of sovereignty over the Antarctic Peninsula was made. Importantly, this act made clear that it was not an initial claim to ownership, but rather a formal delimitation of Argentina’s sovereignty that went all the way back to the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494. Instead of using scientific research as a major justification for sovereignty claims, Argentina officials tended to build their arguments on proximity and connection to the Antarctic Peninsula region.22
In 1943, a military coup overthrew the government of Ramón Castillo, and replaced it with a nationalist leaning military government, out of which an ambitious army colonel named Juan Domingo Perón emerged as the elected President of Argentina, in 1946. Somewhat surprisingly, despite appropriating much of the nationalist rhetoric that had been building over the past several decades, President Perón was initially reluctant to embrace the cause of Argentine sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula region, despite its obvious anti-imperial potential. This reluctance can be attributed, at least in part, to the prominent role of the Argentine Navy in Antarctic affairs, and Perón’s mutual hostility with this institution. Fairly quickly, however, the new President came to embrace his “Antarctic Dream” and began an aggressive pursuit of Argentine sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula region.23 His right-hand man in this effort was army officer Hernán Pujato, who brought a fully articulated “Antarctic Plan” to the President that offered the opportunity of wresting control of Antarctic affairs away from the Navy.24 In the late 1940s, Perón put into practice many elements of Pujato’s plan and boasted of Argentina’s policy of saturating the Antarctic Peninsula with Argentine stations.
For half a decade or so, before Perón was overthrown by a military coup in 1955, Argentina could claim to be winning what had developed into a four-way contest for Antarctic sovereignty, not only against Great Britain and Chile, but also to some extent the United States as well.25 Perón’s embrace of scientific research in areas such as solar radiation as a means of demonstrating Argentine political rights represented something of a move away from the environmental nationalism that had characterized much of Argentina’s interest in the Antarctic Peninsula region up to this point. Such attitudes were consistent with Pujato’s ideas about race in Antarctica, and his desire to demonstrate that Argentine criollos were as capable “as any representative of the Nordic race.”26 Whether or not such a strategy can be classified as genuine “anti-imperialism” is open for debate. But Perón certainly continued to present his claims to Antarctica in the language of anti-colonial nationalism, even after he was overthrown.
Chile and Antarctica
In a fashion similar to Argentina, Chilean interest in Antarctica has much to tell us about the history of the country more generally. In particular, it highlights the importance of ideas of territory to the construction of a distinctive national identity.27 For Chile, one of the most contentious territorial issues was the sovereignty of the vast region of Patagonia at the extreme south of South America. In the 1870s and 1880s, with Chile distracted by the War of the Pacific with Peru and Bolivia, Argentina expanded southwards into Patagonia in a conflict with indigenous populations that became known as the “War of the Desert.” Argentine expansion into this southern territory led to the signature of the 1881 treaty, which divided the Patagonian region between Chile and Argentina, with the boundary drawn along a line marked by the highest peaks of the Andes Mountains.28 While this agreement brought a temporary end to territorial uncertainty, many Chileans came to see this Treaty as an unnecessary surrender of territory that rightfully belonged to them. By the turn of the 20th century, the notion of de facto territorial loss since independence from Spain was at least as strong in Chile as it was in Argentina.29
Given that many Chilean political thinkers had a pre-existing belief that they had lost territory to Argentina over the course of the 19th century, the increasing interest that their trans-Andean neighbors were starting to show in the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula in the first decades of the 20th century caused alarm. Even without a firm conception that parts of Antarctic belonged to them, there was a fear that Chile could once again lose territory to Argentina through failure to pay sufficient attention to protection of their rights. As in Argentina, Chilean interests in Antarctica were heightened by the “heroic era” of the first two decades of the 20th century, and the development of the Antarctic whaling industry that was taking place at around the same time. Just like Argentina, Chile participated in a high profile rescue mission. With the crew of Ernest Shackleton’s Endurance expedition stranded on Elephant Island, it was the Chilean ship Yelcho under the command of Piloto Pardo that sailed to the rescue in August 1916.
One of the paradoxes of early Latin American interest in Antarctica is that, although Chilean interest was largely motivated by rivalry with Argentina, their arguments for sovereignty in the southern continent had much in common, and this encouraged the two countries to work together, at least partially. The idea of a “South American Antarctica” built on the idea of an “American Antarctica” proposed by Chilean geographer Luis Risopatrón in 1908, and on the joint Chilean-Argentine discussions that had begun in 1906.30 In the 1930s and 1940s, there was a growing anti-imperialism in both Chilean and Argentine attitudes towards Antarctic sovereignty: it made little sense to either Latin American country that a distant colonial power should claim ownership of a region that was located so close to the South America. Ultimately, the idea of South American Antarctica could not overcome the rivalry between Argentina and Chile, and it was used to paper over the facts that the two countries could not agree on a mutually acceptable territorial boundary in the Antarctic Peninsula region. But the concept nevertheless offers an interesting example of a Latin American political identity that transcended the nation state.31
Even more than was the case with Argentina, Chilean arguments for Antarctic sovereignty were characterized by a consistent “environmental nationalism,” which rejected the imperial claims made by Great Britain that the conduct of useful scientific research could function as a justification for Antarctic sovereignty. In part, this was a practical strategy that stemmed from the realization that Chile could not compete in what the distinguished Chilean international lawyer Julio Escudero labeled the “race for bases” in the Antarctic Peninsula region. But there was also a genuine idealism to this position, as highlighted by a speech made by the Foreign Minister Raúl Juliet at the time of the first official Chilean expedition to Antarctica, early in 1946:
The Antarctic territory embraces undoubted wealth and possibilities. But even if there was nothing of value, even if in the Chilean Sector there was not but the cold and desolate prolongation of the fatherland, there would exist on our part the obligation to preserve and defend it, precisely for that reason: that it is the southern part of Chile, an integral part of her soil … I am of those who believe that the national patrimony, whatever may be its importance, must be kept intact as we received it from our fathers, and passed on in the same form to future generations.32
The idea that Antarctica belonged to Chile regardless of its economic value offered a stark contrast to the economically motivated British claim and a powerful statement of Chilean environmental nationalism.
The highpoint of Chilean anti-imperial nationalism in Antarctica came with the visit of President Gabriel González Videla in February 1948, which made him the first head of state to travel to the southern continent.33 Although less of a transformative figure than President Perón of Argentina, González Videla was no less of a nationalist. At the opening of a new Chilean station in the South Shetland Islands, he railed against British claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies and asserted that a distant imperial power had no rights to claim Chilean territory. Interestingly, he took his wife and two daughters with him to the Antarctic Peninsula region, despite the inherent dangers and discomfort involved in a voyage across the Drake Passage. The presence of Chile’s first family in the Chilean Antarctic helped rhetorically to domesticate this part of the national territory, giving strength to the claims that this was no less part of Chile than any other part of the country.
Latin America and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty
In February 1952, Argentine sailors opened fire over the heads of British scientists attempting to reconstruct a station at Hope Bay, on the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. In retaliation, in the following season the British forcibly removed Argentine and Chilean stations from Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands. These incidents caused particular alarm to the United States, which feared that a conflict among its Cold War allies could jeopardize the united front against communism. Although the United States had its own interests in pursuing political claims across the Antarctic continent, officials in Washington took a lead in seeking a peaceful solution to the question of Antarctic sovereignty.34 One of the ideas that they pursued was a “modus operandi” solution, which had originally been suggested in the late 1940s by the Chilean international lawyer Julio Escudero. Despite a number of different initiatives, however, these early U.S. efforts to find a peaceful solution had little immediate success in resolving the problem of Antarctic sovereignty. The problem was heightened even further in 1955, when both Chile and Argentina rejected a suggestion by Great Britain that the three countries should take their dispute over Antarctic sovereignty to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.35
At the same time as the governments of Buenos Aries and Santiago were rejecting the British request for international arbitration, plans for a major scientific research endeavor across the Antarctic Continent were rapidly accelerating.36 According to its often-repeated origin story, the idea for a Third International Polar Year, had first been proposed at a dinner in Silver Spring, Maryland, in honor of the visiting British scientist Sydney Chapman (earlier Polar Years involving extensive work in the Arctic, and to a lesser extent the Antarctic, had been held in 1882–1883 and 1932–1933).37 The Second World War had seen the development of a variety of new technologies that could be applied to the scientific research, especially in the field of geophysics, and the scientists gathered at the Maryland dinner were keen to take advantage of a period of high sunspot activity in the late 1950s. Plans for an International Polar Year, quickly developed into more ambitious plans for a truly global International Geophysical Year (IGY) under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions, with synchronous geophysical measurements being taken around the world. Along with outer space, research in the Arctic and Antarctica remained central to the work of the IGY.
Officials in Argentina and Chile recognized that the IGY played to the strengths of their political rivals in the Antarctic Peninsula region, and neither country was an enthusiastic participant in the work of the IGY.38 When decisions had to be made as to whether their countries should take part in this international scientific endeavor, however, officials in both Buenos Aires and Santiago reasoned that it was better to be on the inside of the planning meetings that could shape the political future of the Antarctic continent than left on the outside. At an IGY planning conference held in Paris in 1955, the two South American countries jointly proposed a “Gentleman’s Agreement,” by which twelve countries participating in Antarctic research agreed that none of the activities taking place as part of this work would have any influence on the question of sovereignty.39 While this agreement certainly helped Argentine and Chilean policy makers justify their decision to participate, in reality it did nothing to sever the relationship between science and politics in the Antarctic continent.
During the eighteen months of the IGY from 1957 to 1958, both South American nations made a respectable contribution to scientific research in Antarctica (Figure 2).40 In the case of Argentina, this contribution was almost certainly less than it would have been without the upheaval of the 1955 coup. Chile’s scientific work was hampered by a fire that burned down the Risopatrón scientific research station, which had been built specifically for the IGY. In a notable contrast to both the United States and the Soviet Union, the two Latin American countries restricted their scientific research to parts of the Antarctic continent that they claimed. Despite this obvious nationalism, the participation of Argentina, and even more especially Chile, in this international scientific research effort marked a significant break from the environmental nationalism that had largely characterized their Antarctic policies up to this point.41 Argentine and Chilean scientific research was largely limited to more basic scientific observations in fields such as meteorology and biology, but this work undoubtedly made a contribution to the overall scientific achievements of the IGY.42
Before the IGY had even officially begun, officials from Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand held a series of meeting to attempt to build on the scientific goodwill, to construct a lasting political solution to the “Antarctic Problem.” These four English-speaking countries had a common goal of reducing the political tensions across the Antarctic continent and bringing some sort of resolution to the question of sovereignty. A major motivation for these meetings was the fear that the Soviet Union was extending its interests in the southern continent and the related concern that communist propaganda was making the most of the discord in the Antarctic Peninsula region among three of its Cold War enemies. In 1958, President Eisenhower issued an invitation to the other eleven nations participating in IGY scientific research—including Argentina, Chile, Britain, and the Soviet Union—to attend a preliminary set of meetings in Washington, DC to discuss the political future of the Antarctic Continent.43
In much the same way as Argentina and Chile were reluctant collaborators in the scientific work of the IGY, both were also slow to embrace the possibility of an international resolution to the question of Antarctic sovereignty. By the late 1950s, public opinion in both Latin American countries was firmly behind the idea that the Antarctic Peninsula region was a formal part of their national territories, and any surrender of sovereignty in Antarctica would undermine their territorial integrity. Politicians and officials in Buenos Aires and Santiago tended to share these sentiments, but there was also a pragmatic sense that something needed to be done to move the question of Antarctic sovereignty forward, especially given the Cold War implications of their disputes with Great Britain. Argentina and Chile both accepted the U.S. invitation to participate in the Washington talks. Throughout the negotiations, the Latin American representatives made frequent statements about their sovereign rights to Antarctic territory and their unwillingness to sign any treaty that might diminish their rights to the Antarctic Peninsula region.44
On December 1, 1959, after almost two months of formal negotiations at the State Department, representatives from Argentina and Chile joined those from the ten other nations that had participated in the Antarctic section of the IGY in signing the Antarctic Treaty. This treaty labeled Antarctica as a continent dedicated to peace and science, and sought to perpetuate the goodwill generated by the international research of the second half of the 1950s. The key part of the Treaty for Argentina and Chile, as well as for almost all the other signatories, was Article IV, which “froze” all existing sovereignty claims and reservations of rights to Antarctica in a state of suspended animation.45 Essentially formalizing the “gentleman’s agreement” of the IGY planning discussions, Article IV meant that nothing done in Antarctica while the Treaty was in effect would have any impact on the question of sovereignty. While the legal basis of Article IV was only marginally stronger than the earlier agreement, it nevertheless gave both Argentina and Chile the ability to make a case that, by mentioning the existence of their claims, the Antarctic Treaty implicitly recognizes their sovereignty.
Despite the rhetorical and legal flexibility of Article IV, the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty proved to be a difficult process in Argentina and Chile.46 Opponents of the treaty in both countries argued that its implied internationalism did indeed diminish their sovereignty claims, and consequently represented a dismemberment of their respective national territories. A pamphlet published by one leading Argentine opponent of the Treaty proclaimed, “Our Antarctica is neither conquered or annexed territory. The Antarctic Treaty should not be ratified.”47 In early 1961, President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina sailed to Deception Island to make a highly publicized plea for legislators to accept the Treaty. In the end, Argentina and Chile (as well as Australia, which had run into its own political problems with ratification) agreed to ratify the Treaty on the same day. On June 23, 1961, with the passing of ratification legislation in Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Canberra, the Antarctic Treaty came into effect. For the two South American nations, the need to ratify the Treaty on the same day represented both ongoing suspicion and an inability to separate themselves, which nicely encapsulated much of the previous half century or more of Latin American interest in Antarctica.
Other Latin American Countries and Antarctica
Following the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in June 1961, Argentina and Chile began to move quite quickly from being reluctant collaborators to being enthusiastic participants in Antarctica’s new governing structure. Policy makers in Buenos Aires and Santiago came to see the developing ATS as a convenient means of protecting their interests, while giving both countries a prominent role in a prestigious international “club.” Although both the Argentine and Chilean Antarctic programs remained dominated by their respective militaries, and assertions of sovereignty did not go away, there were benefits connected to being associated with the thoroughly modern scientific research that was taking place in Antarctica. Scientists from Argentina and Chile continued to conduct scientific work in Antarctica, along similar lines to that conducted during the IGY. The Argentine and Chilean embrace of the connection between science and political participation was in many ways a dramatic reversal of the environmental nationalism that had characterized Latin American interests in Antarctica prior to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. Even when Argentina went to war with Great Britain over the sovereignty of the Islas Malvinas in 1982, the two belligerent countries continued to work together at Antarctic Treaty meetings, highlighting the value that this system had come to assume.48
The exclusive nature of the Antarctic Treaty would be challenged on several occasions, most notably by Malaysia in the early 1980s. The criticisms built on India’s requests in the late 1950s, that responsibility for Antarctica should be given to the United Nations.49 Malaysia’s challenge to the ATS was framed in the language of the “common heritage of mankind” and took on added urgency as a result of a growing belief that Antarctic may prove to contain a treasure trove of mineral wealth.50 Members of the ATS, however, saw no reason to replace a functioning international system with what they believed would be the destabilizing influence of the United Nations. As demonstrated by the Argentine and Chilean participation in the UN debates of the early 1980s, the presence of two Latin American countries on the inside of the Antarctic Treaty helped diffuse some of these criticisms.51 The fact that Argentine and Chilean officials were making the case against “the danger of false utopias” would turn out to be one of the major contributions of the two original Latin American members of the ATS.52
Despite its exclusivity, the Antarctic Treaty offered clear directions to other Latin American countries with an interest in Antarctica: an application for non-consultative status was to be followed by the establishment of a scientific research program in Antarctica and then a request for full membership. Behind Argentina and Chile, the third Latin American nation to engage actively with Antarctica was Brazil.53 As the “sector principle” developed into the most common form of delimiting sovereignty over Antarctica, Brazilian geopolitical thinkers began to look to the south and realized that they had a good claim to a large part of Antarctic territory based on the fact that there was very little land between them and the Weddell Sea region.54 This “frontage theory” in some ways connected back to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, when Portugal had been granted dominion over the territory to the east of the line of demarcation. Strategists in the Brazilian government were also attracted by the resource potential of Antarctica, and as speculation about the presence of minerals and hydrocarbons increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Brazil established a scientific station on King George Island in the South Shetlands and applied successfully to become a full consultative member of the ATS in 1983.55 Naming the Station after Comandante Ferraz, a recently deceased naval officer who had done much to promote Brazilian involvement with Antarctica, highlighted the prominent role of the Brazilian military in Antarctic affairs.
In December 1984, Uruguay opened Base Artigas on King George Island, and began a program of Antarctic science. At the Antarctic Treaty meeting the following year, Uruguay was granted consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty, becoming the fourth Latin American Country to join the club. The naming of their Antarctic Research Station after José Gervasio Artigas, the great hero of Uruguayan independence and nation building, reflected the nationalism of the early naming conventions of Argentine and Chilean stations. At the time of its promotion to full membership of the Antarctic Treaty, Uruguay was emerging from a twelve-year period of military dictatorship, and geopolitical thinking had been central to Uruguay’s interests in Antarctica. In a fashion similar to Brazil, although to a much lesser extent, Uruguay could claim an Antarctic “frontage” in line with the sector principle. And with both Argentina and Brazil now having active interests in Antarctica, there was a sense that Uruguay did not want to be left behind by its powerful neighbors, especially given the prospect for economic gain through the Antarctic minerals negotiations.56
While geopolitics also exerted a major influence on Peru’s developing interests in Antarctica over the course of the 1980s, its decision to name its Antarctic Research Station Machu Picchu Base marked something of a departure for Latin American interests in Antarctica.57 Opened in early 1989, the naming of their scientific research center in the southern continent after the royal Inca city sought to commemorate Peru’s pre-Columbian past. This choice of name did not reflect an unproblematic embrace of Peru as an indigenous nation, but it nevertheless stood out from the tradition of naming Antarctic research stations after heroes from the national period.58 As well as celebrating Inca scientific achievements, the naming of Machu Picchu station sought to legitimize a non-white presence in the Antarctic continent. After the opening of Machu Picchu station, the Peruvians almost immediately received consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty later in 1989.
Following the lead of Peru, Ecuador established a station on Greenwich Island in 1990 and became a full member of the Antarctic Treaty later that year. The station was named Maldonado Base, in honor of the 18th-century scientist from Riobamba in the Audiencia of Quito. In a nice irony, Pedro Vicente Maldonado’s reputation was closely connected to the tropics, as a member of the French Geodesic expedition that had explored the equatorial regions of South America in an effort to measure the roundness of Earth.59 Once again, the influence of geopolitical thinking can be seen in Ecuador’s decision to join the Antarctic Treaty, especially in the ongoing rivalry with Peru and the prospect of participating in a minerals bonanza. In this context, Maldonado’s name could be invoked for the role he played in expanding the interior boundaries of the state that would become Ecuador. But as a scientist with international collaborations, Maldonado’s name was also in keeping with the scientific internationalism of the Antarctic Treaty. Along with the other nations in Latin America, Ecuador may have been joining the Treaty in the hope of participating in the exploitation of the continent’s mineral wealth, but it fully understood the rhetoric of international science, and was prepared to frame its interest in these terms.
In October 1991, less than a year after Ecuador had achieved full membership in the Antarctic Treaty, the consultative members performed an abrupt about-turn on the question of mineral exploitation. Faced with pressure from environmental organizations and the growing acceptance that there was little of immediate economic value in Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty Nations abandoned the minerals convention and instead agreed to turn Antarctica into one of the most protected environments anywhere on the planet. By the terms of the 1991 Madrid Environmental Protocol, all activities related to the exploitation of mineral resources were prohibited for its duration, and strict regulations were applied to what could be taken onto and off the continent.60 Three other Latin American nations had become non-consultative members of the ATS by the time of the Madrid Protocol—Cuba (1984), Columbia (1989), and Guatemala (1991)—and none of those have gone onto become full members. Only one Latin American nation—Venezuela in 1999—has become a non-consultative member of the ATS since the signing of the Madrid Protocol. This dramatic deceleration of Latin American interest in Antarctica affairs after the signing of the Madrid Protocol suggests that much of the interest in the 1980s had been driven by the prospect of sharing in an Antarctic minerals bonanza.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Argentina and Chile vied with each other to have the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty located in their respective capitals. Despite opposition from Great Britain, Argentina won this contest, and the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was opened in Buenos Aires in 2004. The Secretariat has no executive power, and decisions continue to be made at annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative meetings. But the ATS has evolved into an enduring and much-lauded international system, one that has become a model or suggested model for other attempts to bring peace to disputed places.61 In thinking about the success of the ATS, it is important to consider the role played from the beginning by countries from Latin America. Perhaps most importantly, by bringing their own distinctive perspectives to discussion of Antarctic politics, Argentina and Chile brought the notion of difference into the negotiations, and prevented the ATS from being even more of an exclusive, colonial, club. With frequent references being made to sovereignty, there is still some sense that Latin American attitudes towards Antarctica remain different from other nations. But by joining the ATS and becoming enthusiastic members, the countries of Latin America have arguably become more similar, in their visions of Antarctica, to the countries they started out by criticizing.
Discussion of the Literature
Given the fact that Antarctica offers a potentially very useful location for examining the 20th century history of Latin America, the southern continent has received surprisingly little attention from scholars of the region. Much of the early Latin American scholarly interest in Antarctica came from political nationalists and geopolitical thinkers. In Argentina, for example, Juan Carlos Moreno’s Nuestras Malvinas. La Antártida, was typical of a number of books that made a case for Argentine sovereignty in the southern continent. Books like Oscar Vila Labra’s Historia y Geografía de la Antártica Chilena made a similar case for Chilean sovereignty. In both countries, there is a strong tradition of geopolitical engagement with the southern continent: Adolfo Quevedo Paiva’s Medio Siglo del Ejército Argentino en Nuestra Antártida is a representative example from Argentina, while Fernando Bustamante’s La Antártida y el Pensamiento Geopolítico de las Fuerzas Armadas Chilenas offers a nice summary of Chilean geopolitical thought relating to Antarctica.62
When scholars from outside the region began to engage with Latin America and Antarctica, they often focused on the geopolitical dimensions of this interest. Jack Child’s Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum is a pioneering study of South American interests in Antarctica, although it stops short of a thorough analysis of the internal politics that often stimulated this interest. Building on Child’s work, the development of a field of study known as critical geopolitics has sought to probe more deeply into the question of why a geopolitical vision remained so strong in Latin America. Klaus Dodds’ Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Ocean Rim contains a thorough analysis of South American interests in Antarctica alongside an examination of other southern hemisphere countries. These studies, and others like them written from outside the region, have built on an internal critique of a geopolitical vision elaborated by scholars such as the Argentine political scientists Carlos Escudé in works such as La Patología del Nacionalismo Argentino.63
The scholarly associations with nationalism, and with the military, may partly explain the apparent reluctance of Latin American historians more broadly—both inside and outside the region—to engage with the history of Latin American Antarctica. An early scholarly treatment of Argentine and Chilean claims to Antarctica was William Hunter Christie’s The Antarctic Problem, although this is very much written from a British perspective. Legal studies such as Juan Carlos Puig’s, La Antártida Argentina ante el Derecho and Francisco Orrego Vicuña’s Derecho Internacional de la Antártida contain significant historical discussions, although these works often have an underlying bias. More recent scholarship on the history of Argentine and Chilean interests in Antarctica has moved away from some of the more explicit political assertions, but the unresolved question of who owns Antarctica cannot be avoided entirely. In Argentina, Miryam Colacrai’s published doctoral dissertation Continuidades y Cambios en la Política Antártica Argentina desde 1959 hasta el Presente: Conjugación de Factores Internos y Externos offers a useful examination of Argentine Antarctic policy since the signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; Pablo Fontana’s La Pugna Antártica, el Conflict por el Sexto Continente: 1939–1959 provides a thorough examination of Argentina’s Antarctic history in the middle decades of the 20th century. In Chile, Consuelo Leon Woppke and Mauricio Jara Fernández’s Pensamiento Antártico Chileno: Referencias Bibliograficas is representative of a series of thorough studies that have examined Chilean Antarctic Policy with a strong emphasis on primary sources. Adrian Howkins’ Frozen Empires: An Environmental History of the Antarctic Peninsula is an attempt to bring Argentine, Chilean, British, and U.S. interests in the Antarctic Peninsula region together. The work of historical archeologists Ximena Senatore and Andres Zarankin, including Historias de un Pasado en Blanco: Arqueolgía Histórica Antártica has made a concerted effort to abandon nationalist perspectives and examine early 19th-century sealing in the Antarctic Peninsula region on its own terms.64
Beyond Argentina and Chile, studies of other Latin American interests in Antarctica are relatively scarce and tend to be found in articles and chapters rather than book-length studies. Some exceptions include Leo Evandro Figueiredo dos Santos’ O Pensamento Politico-Jurídico e o Brasil na Antártida for Brazil, Matias Casto’s Terra Ignota: La Historia de Uruguay en la Antártida for Uruguay, and J. Romero Ojeda’s El Peru y la Antártida: Una Vision de Futuro for Peru, although these tend to be written as much from a political science perspective as from a historical perspective.65
General histories of Antarctica written in English tend to underemphasize the role played by Latin American countries, although there are signs that this may be changing. David Day’s Antarctica: A Biography, for example, provides a fairly thorough treatment of Argentine and Chilean interests in Antarctica, at least up to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. It is worth noting that the classics of Latin American polar literature look quite different from the English-language corpus, which tends to emphasize accounts from the heroic age by men such as Captain Scott, Ernest Shackleton, and Douglas Mawson. Influential books in Argentina include José María Sobral’s account of his participation in the Nordenskjold Expedition, Dos Años entre los Hielos and José Manuel Moneta’s Cuatro Años en las Orcadas del Sur, about his work as a meteorologist in the South Orkney Islands. In Chile, Francisco Coloane’s children’s book Los Conquistadores de la Antártida transported some of the myths and legends of southern Chile to the Antarctic Peninsula region. Outside the region, the North American author Ursula Le Guin’s fascinating short story, titled “Sur,” published in The New Yorker, offers a feminist retelling of the heroic era of Antarctic exploration with protagonists from across Latin America.66
The two most important archival collections related to the political history of Latin American interests in Antarctica are the Archive of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations and Culture in Buenos Aires and the Archive of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago. The Chilean archive, in particular, has a substantial quantity of information relating to Antarctica available online. In addition to political documents, both archives contain some material relating to Argentine and Chilean scientific work and logistics in Antarctica. The archives of the different branches of the military (army, navy, and air force) in Argentina and Chile also contain documentation relating to Antarctic logistics and science. These archival collections may be more difficult to access than the Foreign Ministry Archives. The respective national archives in Argentina and Chile also have some material on the history of Antarctica, although this is less than the material in the Foreign Ministry Archives. For information about the scientific work conducted in Antarctica by Argentina and Chile, the most useful collections (mostly grey literature and publications) can be found at the Argentine Antarctic Institute in Buenos Aires and the Chilean National Antarctic Institute in Punta Arenas. For the administrative history of Argentine Antarctica and Chilean Antarctica, the regional archives of the Tierra del Fuego Province in Ushuaia and the Magallanes Province in Punta Arenas may also contain some helpful documents.
Foreign archives also contain substantial material relating to the history of Latin American interests in Antarctica. State Department and Department of Defense records held at the U.S. National Archives in Maryland contain information about Argentine and Chilean activities in Antarctica, especially in the middle decades of the 20th century. Many of the State Department documents have been published as part of the Foreign Relations of the United States series, some of which are available online. Similarly, the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and other government department records at the National Archives in London contain voluminous correspondence relating to Argentine and Chilean activities, in the territory the British knew as the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Information about Argentine and Chilean activities Antarctic Treaty negotiations and meetings can be found in conference diaries at the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge. The Antarctic Treaty Secretariat in Buenos Aires maintains on online archive of documents relating to the Antarctic Treaty system, which are available in all four official languages of the Antarctic Treaty (English, Japanese, Russian, and Spanish). The United Nations published the material related to the United Nations Antarctic Debates of the early 1980s, much of which relates to Latin American interests.
Since much less work has been done on the history of other Latin American countries with an interest in Latin America, it is difficult to recommend sources. A good place to start research on the other Latin American consultative members of the Antarctic Treaty is a collection of Antarctic documents published by W. M. Bush in 1988 titled Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents.67 Presumably the Foreign Ministry Archives in Brasilia, Montevideo, Lima, and Montevideo would be good places to continue this research.
Child, Jack. Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum. New York: Praeger, 1988.Find this resource:
Christie, Eric William Hunter. The Antarctic Problem: An Historical and Political Study. London: Allen & Unwin, 1951.Find this resource:
Colacrai, Miryam. “Continuidades Y Cambios en la Política Antártica Argentina desde hasta el Presente: Conjugación de Factores Internos y Externos.” PhD dissertation, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2003.Find this resource:
Coloane, Francisco. Los Conquistadores De La Antártida. Santiago, Chile: Zig-Zag, 1945.Find this resource:
Day, David. Antarctica: A Biography. North Sydney, N.S.W.: Random House Australia, 2012.Find this resource:
Dodds, Klaus. Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim. Chichester, U.K.: J. Wiley, 1997.Find this resource:
Escudé, Carlos. La Patología Del Nacionalismo Argentino. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Tesis, 1991.Find this resource:
Fontana, Pablo. La Pugna Antártica, El Conflicto Por El Sexto Continente: 1939–1959. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Guazuvira Ediciones, 2014.Find this resource:
Genest, Eugenio A. Antártida Sudamericana Aportes Para Su Comprension. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Dirección Nacional del Antartico, Instituto Antártico Argentino, 2001.Find this resource:
Howkins, Adrian. Frozen Empires: An Environmental History of the Antarctic Peninsula. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.Find this resource:
Leon Woppke, Consuelo, and Mauricio Jara Fernández. Pensamiento Antartico Chileno: Referencias Bibliograficas. Viña del Mar, Chile: LW Editorial, 2015.Find this resource:
Moneta, José Manuel. Cuatro Años En Las Orcadas Del Sur: Narraciones y Hechos Salientes de las Expediciones Argentinas (2d ed.). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Peuser, 1940.Find this resource:
Puig, Juan Carlos. La Antártida Argentina ante El Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentina: R. Depalma, 1960.Find this resource:
Sobral, José M., and Jorge Rabassa. Dos Años Entre Los Hielos, 1901–1903. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 2003.Find this resource:
Zarankín, Andrés, and M. Ximena Senatore. Historias de un Pasado en Blanco: Arqueología Histórica Antártica. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Argumentum, 2007.Find this resource:
(1.) See, for example, Juan Carlos Puig, La Antártida Argentina Ante El Derecho (Buenos Aires, Argentina: R. Depalma, 1960).
(2.) Adrian Howkins, Frozen Empires: An Environmental History of the Antarctic Peninsula (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
(3.) Jack Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (New York: Praeger, 1988); and Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim (Chichester, U.K.: J. Wiley, 1997).
(4.) Howkins, Frozen Empires.
(5.) Peter Beck, “The United Nations and Antarctica,” Polar Record 22.137 (1984): 137–144.
(6.) James D. Hansom and John E. Gordon, Antarctic Environments and Resources: A Geographical Perspective (New York: Longman, 1998).
(7.) Andrés Zarankín and M. Ximena Senatore, Historias De Un Pasado En Blanco: Arqueología Histórica Antártica (Horizonte, Brazil: Argumentum, 2007).
(8.) Barry M. Gough, The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: The Contest for Empire in the South Atlantic (London: Athlone Press, 1992).
(9.) Rosana Gúber, Por Qué Malvinas? De La Causa Nacional a La Guerra Absurda (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001).
(10.) H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).
(11.) Carlos Escudé, La Patología Del Nacionalismo Argentino (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Tesis, 1991).
(12.) See, for example, Alfredo L. Palacios, Las Islas Malvinas, Archipiélago Argentino (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Claridad, 1934).
(13.) See, for example, David Day, Antarctica: A Biography (North Sydney, N.S.W.: Random House Australia, 2012).
(14.) José M. Sobral and Jorge Rabassa, Dos Años Entre Los Hielos, 1901–1903 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 2003).
(15.) José Manuel Moneta, Cuatro Años en las Orcadas Del Sur; Narraciones y Hechos Salientes de las Expediciones Argentinas (2d ed.). (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Peuser, 1940).
(16.) J. N. Tønnessen and Arne Odd Johnsen, The History of Modern Whaling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
(17.) Ian B. Hart, Pesca: The History of Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima of Buenos Aires: An Account of the Pioneer Modern Whaling and Sealing Company in the Antarctic (Salcombe, U.K.: Aidan Ellis, 2002).
(18.) Eugenio A. Genest, Antártida Sudamericana Aportes para su Comprension (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Dirección Nacional del Antartico, Instituto Antártico Argentino, 2001).
(19.) Eric William Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem: An Historical and Political Study (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951).
(20.) Adrian Howkins, “Icy Relations: The Emergence of South American Antarctica during the Second World War,” Polar Record 42.2 (2006): 153–165.
(21.) Alberto Oddera, La Campaña Antártica 1941–42 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto Antártico Argentino, 1959); and Silvina Harriague, La Campaña Antártica 1942–43 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto Antártico Argentino, 1959).
(22.) Howkins, Frozen Empires, 64–65.
(23.) Tomás Eloy Martínez, The Perón Novel (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).
(24.) Eugenio A. Genest, Pujato y la Antártida Argentina en la Década del Cincuenta (Buenos Aires, Argentina: H. Senado de la Nación, Secretaría Parlamentaria, Dirección Publicaciones, 1998); and Susana Rigoz, Hernán Pujato: El Conquistador del Desierto Blanco (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial María Ghirlanda, 2002).
(25.) Pablo Fontana, La Pugna Antártica, El Conflicto Por El Sexto Continente: 1939–1959 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Guazuvira Ediciones, 2014).
(26.) Quoted in Howkins, Frozen Empires, 119.
(27.) Consuelo Leon Woppke and Mauricio Jara Fernández, Pensamiento Antartico Chileno: Referencias Bibliograficas (LW Editorial, 2015).
(28.) Susana Bandieri, Historia de la Patagonia (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005).
(29.) Jose Miguel Irarrazabal Larrain, La Patagonia: Errores Geograficos Y Diplomaticos, Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales de Chile (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1966).
(30.) For a discussion of South American Antarctica, see Genest, Antártida Sudamericana Aportes Para Su Comprension; Howkins, “Icy Relations.”
(31.) Howkins, “Icy Relations.”
(32.) Quoted in Howkins, Frozen Empires, 78.
(33.) Gabriel González Videla, Memorias (Santiago, Chile: Gabriela Mistral, 1975).
(34.) For a detailed discussion of U.S. Antarctic policy, see Christopher C. Joyner, Eagle Over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997).
(35.) International Court of Justice, Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom V. Argentina: United Kingdom V. Chile): Orders of March 16th, 1956: Removal from the List (The Hague: The Court, 1956).
(36.) Roger D. Launius, James Roger Fleming, and David H. DeVorkin, eds., Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering the Social and Intellectual Implications of the International Polar and Geophysical Years (New York: Palgrave, 2010).
(37.) Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown: The International Geophysical Year (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).
(38.) Adrian Howkins, “Reluctant Collaborators: Argentina and Chile in Antarctica During the IGY,” Journal of Historical Geography 34 (2008).
(39.) Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, Medio Siglo De Recuerdos Antárticos: Memorias (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1994).
(40.) Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown.
(41.) Howkins, Frozen Empires.
(42.) For a fuller discussion of Argentine and Chilean scientific activities in Antarctica during the IGY, see Howkins, “Reluctant Collaborators: Argentina and Chile in Antarctica During the IGY.”
(43.) Day, Antarctica: A Biography.
(44.) See Brian Roberts, Journal: Antarctic Conference, Washington, MS 1308/9, Scott Polar Research Institute Archives, Cambridge.
(46.) See for example, Miryam Colacrai, “Continuidades y Cambios en la Política Antártica Argentina desde 1959 hasta el Presente: Conjugación de Factores Internos y Externos” (PhD diss., Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2003).
(47.) Alberto M. Candioti, Nuestra AntáRtida No es Tierra Conquistada ni Anexada: El Tratado AntáRtico No Debe Ratificarse (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Optimus, 1960).
(48.) Hansom and Gordon, Antarctic Environments and Resources.
(49.) Adrian Howkins, “Defending Polar Empire: Opposition to India's Proposal to Raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at the United Nations in 1956,” Polar Record 44.1 (2008): 35–44.
(50.) Peter Beck, “Twenty Years On: The UN and the ‘Question of Antarctica,’ 1983–2003,” Polar Record 40.3 (2004): 205–212.
(51.) UNO, Question of Antarctica: Study Requested under General Assembly Resolution 38/77 Report of the Secretary General, 4 vols. (New York: United Nations Publications, 1984).
(52.) Howkins, Frozen Empires.
(53.) Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes Neto, “Rising Powers and Antarctica: Brazil’s Changing Interests,” The Polar Journal 4.1 (2014): 12–27.
(54.) Daniela Portella Sampaio, Ignacio Javier Cardone, and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, “A Modest but Intensifying Power? Brazil, the Antarctic Treaty System, and Antarctica,” in Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica, eds. Klaus Dodds, Alan D. Hemmings, and Peder Roberts (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017).
(55.) Leo Evandro Figueiredo dos Santos, O Pensamento PolíTico-JuríDico e o Brasil Na AntáRtida (Curitiba, Brazil: Juruá Editora, 2004).
(56.) Matias Castro, Terra Ignota: La Historia de Uruguay en la Antártida (Montevideo, Uruguay: Fin de Siglo, 2015).
(57.) Julio Romero Ojeda, El Peruy la Antartida: Una Vision de Futuro (Lima, Peru: Universidad Alas Peruanas, 2013).
(58.) See, for example, Alberto Flores Galindo, Carlos Aguirre, Charles F. Walker, and Willie Hiatt, In Search of an Inca: Identity and Utopia in the Andes, New Approaches to the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
(59.) Larrie D. Ferreiro, Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment Expedition that Reshaped Our World (New York: Basic Books, 2013).
(60.) Hansom and Gordon, Antarctic Environments and Resources.
(61.) See, for example, Anne-Marie Brady, The Emerging Politics of Antarctica, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics (New York: Routledge, 2013), 23.
(62.) Juan Carlos Moreno, Nuestras Malvinas: La Antártida (Buenos Aires, Argentina: El Ateneo, 1956); Oscar Vila Labra, Historia y Geografía de la Antártica Chilena (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Tegualda, 1948); Adolfo Quevedo Paiva, Medio Siglo del Ejército Argentino en Nuestra Antártida (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Dunken, 2001); and Fernando Bustamante, La Antártida y el Pensamiento Geopolítico de las Fuerzas Armadas Chilenas (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 1988).
(63.) Jack Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitic; Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica; and Carlos Escudé, Patología del Nacionalismo.
(64.) William Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem; Juan Carlos Puig La Antártida Argentina ante el derecho; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Derecho Internacional de la Antártida (Santiago, Chile; Dolmen Ediciones, 1994); Miryam Colacrai, Continuidades y Cambios en la Política Antártica Argentina desde 1959 hasta el Presente; Pablo Fontana, La Pugna Antártica; Consuelo Leon Woppke and Mauricio Jara Fernández, Pensamiento Antártico Chileno (Viña del Mar, Chile; LW Editorial); Adrian Howkins, Frozen Empires; and Ximena Senatore and Andres Zarankin, Historias de un Pasado en Blanco.
(65.) Leo Evandro Figueiredo dos Santos, O Pensamento Politico-Jurídico; Matias Casto, Terra ignota: La Historia de Uruguay en la Antártida (Montevideo, Uruguay: Editorial Fin de Siglo, 2015); and J. Romero Ojeda, El Peru y la Antártida.
(66.) David Day, Antarctica: A Biography; José María Sobral, Dos Años entre los Hielos; José Manuel Moneta, Cuatro Años en las Orcadas del Sur (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Peuser, 1940); Francisco Coloane, Los Conquistadores de la Antártida (Santiago, Chile: Zigzag, 1945); and Ursula Le Guin, “Sur,” The New Yorker (February 1, 1982).
(67.) W. M. Bush, Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1991–2003).